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The Saga of Indefinitely Detained Mariel
Cubans: Garcia Mir v. Meese
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1980 approximately 115,000 to 130,000 Cubans arrived
by boat on the Florida coast seeking admission to the United States.'
These Cubans are commonly referred to as Mariel Cubans, or
"Marielitos," taken from Mariel Bay, the Cuban port of departure. 2
Most of the new arrivals were placed in detention centers while wait-
ing for sponsors to be located. 3 After screening, many of the detain-
ees were paroled pursuant to immigration law.4 However, over
14,000 Cubans remained detained as of August 1980.5 The Mariel
Cubans were detained for many reasons. Many detainees merely
lacked proper entry papers. While some Marielitos admitted commit-
ting crimes in Cuba, others were judged to be mental incompetents.
6
In late 1980 those still detained were transferred from Florida to
Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary in Kansas. 7 In early 1981 all
Mariel Cubans detained in Kansas were moved to the Federal Peni-
tentiary in Atlanta.8
This Note first analyzes the struggle between the United States
Attorney General, the district court, and the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals to find a workable policy for the release of detained Mariel
1. See Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion-The Rights of Cuban Refugees Facing Indefinite
Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 925, 927 (1984); see also Pollgreen v.
Morris, 496 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
2. See Levy, Detention in the Asylum Context, 44 Prr. L. REV. 297, 305 (1983); see also
Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989, 990 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984).
3. See Boswell, supra note 1, at 929.
4. The applicable statute regarding parole is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) which reads:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien
and when the purpose of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General,
has been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
5. Boswell, supra note 1, at 929.
6. Id. at 930, 934.
7. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734
F.2d 576 (1lth Cir. 1984).
8. Id.
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Cubans. Second, this Note analyzes and critiques plaintiffs' (Mariel
Cubans) arguments of entitlement to parole hearings with due process
rights under the United States Constitution9 because the federal gov-
ernment created a liberty interest for each Mariel Cuban.10 Finally,
this Note critiques the Eleventh Circuits' ruling on plaintiffs' claims. " I
This Note concludes that a portion of the Mariel Cubans were
invited to come to the United States. This invitation coupled with
government regulations created a liberty interest which could be ex-
tinguished only by meeting procedural due process requirements.
A. Distinctions Between Exclusion and Deportation
Under United States immigration law, the distinction between
excludable and deportable aliens is of crucial importance. An alien
who has "entered" the United States can be expelled only through a
deportation hearing, whereas the alien who has not entered the
United States is subject to an exclusion hearing.12 An "entry" occurs
when the alien gains physical admission either by an Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) grant, or through an unlawful border
crossing. ' 3 In contrast, an excludable alien has not entered the United
States, but rather, is seeking admission at the border. 14 Even though
many border crossings are technically within the United States, for
legal purposes, the alien is treated as stopped at the border.15 Like-
wise, the parole statute under which the Mariel Cubans were released
specifically states that the parole of an alien into the United States
does not constitute admission (entry) and despite the alien's physical
presence, the alien is treated as if stopped at the border. 16
The importance of the distinction between deportation and ex-
clusion lies in the constitutional protections required at deportation
hearings which are not required at exclusion hearings. In deportation
hearings the alien is given important procedural protections, 17
9. Id.
10. Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Gar-
cia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
11. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
12. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-28 (1982).
13. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1924); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
14. Id.; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
15. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. at 230.
16. See supra note 4; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. at 186; see also C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.32 (1987).
17. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1982).
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whereas in exclusion hearings the alien is granted only those protec-
tions which Congress has chosen to give.' 8
II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A. Plaintiffs' Claim of Constitutional Due Process Rights
in Parole Hearings
On January 8, 1981 the long judicial saga of Fernandez-Roque/
Garcia-Mir began in the United States District Court in Kansas when
a complaint was filed on behalf of all Mariel Cubans held in Leaven-
worth Federal Penitentiary.' 9 The case was transferred from Kansas
to Georgia when the Attorney General moved the detained Cubans
from Leavenworth, Kansas to the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.
20
On June 5, 1981 Rafael Fernandez-Roque filed a habeas corpus
action on behalf of all Cuban detainees incarcerated at the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary "who were excludable solely on the basis of lack
of entry papers, 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(20)."'2
After the Attorney General reviewed the files of all Cubans in-
carcerated at Atlanta Federal Penitentiary and determined certain
Mariel Cubans to be non-parolable, the plaintiffs renewed their mo-
tion for habeas corpus relief.22 Since the plaintiffs could not be re-
turned to their home country and no other country would accept
them, 23 and because the INS determined them to be non-parolable,
18. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). ("Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as the alien denied entry is
concerned." (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))).
19. Garcia-Mir v. Wilkinson, Case No. 81-398A. The complaint alleged that the Attor-
ney General abused his discretion in continuing to detain Mariel Cubans. In addition, the
complaint asserted that the continued detainment was in violation of the Cubans' constitu-
tional rights and rights under international law. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp.
1115, 1119-20 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
20. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117, 120 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
21. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 928 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (emphasis in
original). Lack of proper entry papers is one of the numerous ways to classify a person who is
stopped at the United States border as excludable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1-33) (1983 & Supp.
1986).
The Attorney General has discretion to parole into the United States aliens who are ap-
plying for admission or those who have final orders of exclusion but whose removal from the
territory is impracticable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(1).
22. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1121.
23. See Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 353, 357 (1986). In December 1984 Cuba agreed to accept the return of
approximately 2,700 Mariel Cubans. In return, the United States agreed to resume the grant-
ing of the normal amount of visas issued to Cuban nationals. 61 Interpreter Releases 1080-81
(Dec. 21, 1984). This agreement was terminated by Fidel Castro in retaliation for the com-
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the incarcerated Cubans were faced with the prospect of indefinite
detention.24
The plaintiffs argued that the Attorney General lacked the statu-
tory authority to indefinitely incarcerate excludable aliens (Mariel
Cubans), 25 but the plaintiffs conceded that the Attorney General has
statutory authority to temporarily detain an excludable alien while
waiting to return the alien to the country of his or her origin. 26 If an
excludable alien could not be expelled from the United States, the
plaintiffs argued that the alien was entitled to a parole hearing with
due process rights.27
In contrast, the government claimed that it could indefinitely de-
tain, without due process requirements, any excludable Mariel Cuban
who it determined to be non-parolable. 28 The government relied on
Palma v. Verdeyen 29 which held that the Attorney General had the
statutory authority to indefinitely incarcerate excluded Cubans who
the INS determined to be non-parolable.
30
The district court held that although the Attorney General does
not hold express statutory power to indefinitely detain excludable
aliens who could not be returned to the country from which they
came, the Attorney General "does possess an implied statutory au-
thority to detain for an indefinite period excludable aliens who cannot
mencement of radio broadcasts into Cuba by the United States sponsored "Radio Marti." 62
Interpreter Releases 483-84 (May 24, 1985).
24. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1122. The Attorney General determined
that for certain Mariel Cubans there were no "emergent reasons" for parole and the parole was
not "strictly in the public interest." See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
25. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1122. The Attorney General has the
discretion to parole an alien applying for admission. See supra note 4. However, the Attorney
General is not given express authority to indefinitely detain. See infra note 197.
26. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith at 1122-23. The Tenth Circuit in Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson found that the statute allowed the Attorney General to detain excludable aliens
while awaiting deportation. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th
Cir. 1981). For an argument that Congress authorized only temporary detention of excludable
aliens, see Helton, supra note 23, at 372-379. Indeed, section 1127 provides for the immediate
physical removal of excludable aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). However, if no
country is willing to accept the excludable alien the code is silent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1127(b)
(Supp. 1986).
27. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1123. The plaintiffs relied primarily on
Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). The Rodriquez-Fernandez
court held that because Cuba would not accept the aliens back, the Mariels were in essence
confined for an indefinite term. Such imprisonment was punishment rather than detainment
while awaiting deportation. Without good cause these Cubans could not be held. Id. at 1387.
28. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1122.
29. 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982).
30. Id. at 104.
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be returned to their country of origin." 3' However, the court went
further to rule that "all persons are entitled to their liberty absent
some legally sufficient reason for detaining them."'32 The court held
that although excludable aliens have no constitutional rights regard-
ing their admission, 33 they do have constitutional rights regarding
their parole.34 The court reasoned that merely because excludable
aliens are treated as if they were stopped at the border, it did not
follow that once within the United States boundaries the alien could
not claim any of the rights given to United States citizens. 35 The
court relied on Jean v. Nelson 36 which rejected the fiction that an ex-
cludable alien does not possess any constitutional rights because the
alien in theory remains outside the country. 37 In addition, the court
cited Plyler v. Doe38 which held that all aliens are "persons" for fifth
and fourteenth amendment purposes. 39
According to the court, "[the plaintiffs] simply assert a right to
be free from arbitrary detention despite the government's determina-
tion that they are excludable." 4 The court distinguished Greenholtz
v. Nebraska,41 which held that a convicted person has no constitu-
tional right to be paroled before expiration of his sentence.42 The
court reasoned that excludable aliens, unlike convicted prisoners,
were not afforded due process rights before being imprisoned and thus
were entitled to due process rights in parole determinations. 43
Thus, the court concluded that if the Attorney General deter-
mines that an alien is excludable, but expulsion is impracticable, the
Attorney General can exercise the authority to detain:
only for an initial, temporary period of time .... Thereafter, a
liberty interest arises on behalf of the alien detainee requiring that
the continued exercise of the detention power be justified on the
31. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1124.
32. Id. at 1128.
33. Id. at 1125 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)).
34. Id., at 1125.
35. Id. at 1125-26.
36. 711 F.2d 1455 (1 1th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 727 F.2d 957 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd
on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
37. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d at 1484.
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
39. Id. at 210.
40. Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 734 F.2d 576 (1lth Cir. 1984).
41. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
42. Id. at 16.
43. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. at 1127.
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basis of a procedurally adequate finding that the detainee, if re-
leased, is likely to abscond, or to pose a threat to persons or prop-
erty within the United States.44
The court ruled that to insure that the continued detention of
excludable aliens is procedurally adequate, the aliens have the follow-
ing rights: (1) the right to written notice of allegations supporting
continued detention;45 (2) the right to present witnesses; 46 (3) the
right to cross-examination; 47 (4) the right to a neutral decision-
maker; 48 (5) the privilege against self-incrimination; 49 and (6) the
right to counsel. 50
B. The Eleventh Circuit Denial of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claim
The Eleventh Circuit, in reversing the district court decision,
51
held that since parole is an integral part of the admission process, an
excludable alien has no constitutional rights regarding his parole.
52
According to the court, a prior Eleventh Circuit en banc ruling53 de-
termined that parole was an integral part of the admission process
and hence no constitutional rights were available to the excludable
alien for purposes of challenging parole determinations. 54 The court
quoted the policy rationale of Jean v. Nelson: "A foreign leader could
eventually compel us to grant physical admission via parole to any
aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending them here and
then refusing to take them back."' 55
44. Id. at 1128 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 1136.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1137.
49. Id. at 1138.
50. Id. at 1136.
51. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
52. Id. at 581.
53. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (1 th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 472
U.S. 846 (1985). The Supreme Court decided Jean on non constitutional grounds. Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. at 854-57. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, refused to rule on whether
parole was part of the admission process. Id.
54. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 982.
55. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d at 582 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 975).
A plausible explanation for the policy of indefinite detention is the resulting theoretical deter-
rent effect on future aliens coming to the United States without proper documents. See infra
note 62.
276 [Vol. 10:271
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C. Analysis of the Eleventh Circuit Decision
This policy rational is unpersuasive when applied to the district
court's decision. It is simply not true that under the district court's
guidelines a foreign leader could compel the release of any alien sent
to the United States. For example, criminals and mental incompe-
tents would most likely pose a threat to society and hence be un-
releasable. 56 The plaintiffs argued, and the district court held, that
absent sufficient reasons the detainees were required to be paroled.
Nothing in the district court's order required the release of aliens who
pose a danger to life or property. Further, although the Supreme
Court has ruled that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights
regarding their admission, 57 the Court has never decided whether pa-
role is part of the admissions process and thus subject to the same
limitations.
58
The Supreme Court long ago ruled that the Constitution is appli-
56. Judge Shoob in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith ruled that the Attorney General could
justify continued detention of an alien by "a procedurally adequate finding that the detainee, if
released .... pose[s] a serious and significant threat to persons or property within the United
States." Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1128 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 734 F.2d 576 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
57. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
58. See supra note 53. See also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
However, when faced with plaintiffs who are asserting that fifth amendment due process
applies to parole hearings, the government has argued that the holding in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), compels a court to rule that excludable aliens
have no fifth amendment rights in parole hearings. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 970. In
Mezei the Court ruled that an alien found excludable who could not be returned from whence
he came, could be held indefinitely. 345 U.S. at 216. However, rather than the sweeping
reading that the government gives to Mezei, the language of Mezei is limiting: "Ordinarily to
admit an alien barred from entry on security grounds nulifies the very purpose of exclusion
proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
When Jean reached the Supreme Court the majority decided the case on statutory rather
than constitutional grounds. See supra note 53. In contrast, the dissent in Jean (Marshall, J.
with Brennan, J., dissenting) reached the constitutional issue decided by the Eleventh Circuit.
The dissent distinguished Mezei on its facts. Mezei was decided on national security grounds
and any ruling that ordinary excludable aliens possess no fifth amendment protections was
pure dicta. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. at 872 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has ruled on numerous occasions that the fifth amendment protects aliens regardless of
their status. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. Further, the Court has granted
fifth amendment due process protections in exclusion hearings to certain excludable aliens. See
infra notes 203-218 and accompanying text.
Under the rulings in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984) and Jean v.
Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (1 1th Cir. 1984), "the Attorney General could invoke legitimate immi-
gration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained aliens. He might argue that
scarce immigration resources could be better spent by hiring additional agents to patrol our
278 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 10:271
cable to aliens in some situations:59
The Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution is not con-
fined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law . . . .' These provisions are universal in their application to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, color or nationality. 6°
The Court recently affirmed this notion in Plyler v. Doe.
61
In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith (Fernandez-Roque I), it is impor-
tant to remember that the plaintiffs were not seeking a change in their
status as excludable aliens, but rather plaintiffs argued that they were
entitled to due process rights in parole hearings. The plaintiffs in es-
sence were asserting a right thought to be possessed by all people in
free nations-the right to be free from arbitrary detention. 62 Since all
aliens are constitutionally protected from government abuse when in
United States territory, it is logical to extend this protection when an
alien, regardless of whether he is deportable or excludable, is
threatened with indefinite detention.
63
borders than by providing food for detainees." Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. at 874 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
60. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 369. See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976). (The fifth amendment applies to all aliens, even if their presence is "unlawful, involun-
tary, or transitory. ); See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at
§ 1.31.
61. 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981). In Plyler the Supreme Court ruled that all aliens are "per-
sons" for fifth and fourteenth amendment purposes. Id.
62. "Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is generally em-
ployed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond .... Certainly this policy reflects the
humane qualities of an enlightened civilization." Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190
(1958).
While detention was the exception in 1958 the same is not true today. In 1982 the De-
partment of Justice published an interim rule that declared in part: "However, in exercising
this [parole] discretion, district directors should be guided by the fact that the statutory rule is
one of detention, and that the use of parole authority is an exception to that rule and should be
icarefully and narrowly exercised ...." 49 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (1982) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
212 & 235). This change in detention policy is probably grounded in the assumption that
detention works as a deterrent to such mass migrations as the Mariel boat lift. See C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 3.17c. According to one author the result of
this change in policy has led to the imprisonment of aliens from over seventy countries. See
Helton, supra note 23, at 360 n.58.
63. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 877-80 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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III. PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED HABEAS CORPUS CLAIM
In 1985, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for habeas corpus
relief.64 The plaintiffs, narrowed to those who the Attorney General
determined to be non-parolable but not physically removable from the
United States,65 had limited options. They had no constitutional
rights regarding their parole. 66 Further, they had to bring individual
appeals to petition for the reopening of their asylum claims.67
The plaintiffs reasserted two causes of action which had not been
decided. 68 The plaintiffs claimed that they had a "federally created
liberty interest in parole, not arising directly from the Constitution
itself" 69 and that their indefinite detention violated international
64. The district court in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983),
did not reach both of the plaintiffs' causes of action. The court found that the plaintiffs had
constitutional rights to parole hearings and did not rule on whether the federal government
had created a liberty interest. Id. at 1128-29 n.5.
Between 1983 and 1985 the plaintiffs brought two other actions against the Attorney
General. First, the plaintiffs attempted to get their asylum proceedings re-opened on a class
wide basis. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986). The
plaintiffs introduced evidence that if they were returned to Cuba they would be treated like
those who voluntarily returned and were "incarcerated, tortured, indicted, and tried as 'Mariel
scum' who illegally entered Cuba." Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. at 1105. The
district court ruled that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in not consid-
ering "whether the aliens ha[d] demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution." Id. at 1108.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986). The appellate court ruled that the petition for class wide
opening of asylum cases was not proper. Each member of the class had to file separately for
reopening. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d at 1492.
In early 1985 the plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of 147 incarcerated Marielitos who
the Attorney General had approved for release. Ferandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500
'(N.D. Ga.), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986). Apparently the Attorney General halted the release of these Marielitos
because of the December 14, 1984 agreement between the United States and Cuba. See supra
note 23. The district court ruled that by not releasing those approved for release, the Attorney
General abused his discretion. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. at 1506. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, ruling that there was no abuse of discretion. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d at
1485. The court reasoned that as a result of the United States-Cuba agreement, the Attorney
General had a legitimate fear that if released, the Marielitos were likely to abscond. Id.
65. Those who were parolable were released upon finding suitable sponsors. Again, an
agreement between Cuba and the United States in which Cuba was to accept the return of
2,700 Mariel Cubans was reached in 1984. The agreement was suspended soon thereafter. See
supra note 23.
66. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984).
67. See supra note 64. At the time, the Mariel Cuban population at Atlanta federal peni-
tentiary was over 1800. Ferandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1I1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
68. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 890.
69. Id.
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law. 70 This Note addresses the first claim.
A. Federally Created Liberty Interests
The plaintiffs comprised two groups. Group One consisted of
Mariel Cubans who were immediately detained upon arrival and con-
tinued to be detained either because they were mentally incompetent
or because they admitted committing crimes in Cuba.71 Group Two
contained Mariel Cubans who were initially paroled and subsequently
had their parole revoked.72 Although each group asserted that the
government had created a liberty interest, different criteria were used
to support each claim.
1. Creation of Liberty Interests-Limits on Discretion
One way for the government to create a liberty interest is by
placing substantive limits on official discretion. 73 To establish that a
liberty interest exists, the claimant must show that a regulation, stat-
ute, or administrative practice provides the official decision-maker
with standards which limit his discretion.74 In contrast, if the official
decision-maker has unfettered discretion in making a decision, no lib-
erty interest may be created.
75
According to the Fifth Circuit, rarely, if ever, would a govern-
ment admit that a liberty interest was created by governmental ac-
tion.76 A court should look to the essence of the governmental action
70. Id. The international law cause of action was rejected by both the district court and
also Eleventh Circuit. This cause of action will not be discussed in this Note. For an analysis
of international law applied to indefinite exclusion, see Boswell, supra note 1, at 953-69.
71. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 893.
72. Id. at 895. The INS parole revocation policy stated that parole would be revoked if
the Cuban alien is one "who has been convicted in the United States of a felony or a serious
misdemeanor and who has completed the imprisonment portion of the sentence; or ... who
presents a clear and imminent danger to the community or himself." Id. (quoting Declaration
of John A. Simon, Exhibit 15 to the Plaintiffs' Nov. 30, 1984 Brief). However, the court noted
that although some parole revocations resulted from convictions of serious felonies, other
Mariel Cubans had their parole revoked for committing lesser offenses and had served their
sentences. Other Mariel Cubans had their parole revoked for merely being charged with a
crime. Id.
73. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Herman, The New Liberty: The
Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and others under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 482, 520 (1984); Comment, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative Dis-
cretion: The Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017-18 (1986).
74. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979); See also Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
75. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 248-49.
76. Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981).
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to consider whether a liberty interest was created. 77 The significance
of finding that a liberty interest exists is, that once created, this inter-
est can be taken away only by meeting procedural due process
requirements. 7
8
2. An Alternative: Grievous Loss and Liberty Interests
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the right to procedural
due process protections depended "on the extent to which an individ-
ual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' ",79 Later, in an about
face, the Court categorically rejected "the notion that any grievous
loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke proce-
dural protections of the Due Process Clause."80
However, the Court has never repudiated the theory that sub-
stantial grievous loss alone is enough to give rise to a liberty interest.
Indeed, there are Supreme Court decisions which support this posi-
tion. In Morrissey v. Brewer 8' plaintiffs were paroled and subse-
quently had their parole revoked. The parolees argued that in order
to revoke their parole, the state must provide procedural due process
requirements.8 2 In ruling that a liberty interest was created by the
parole of a prisoner, the Court failed to cite any statute, decision, or
state law which limited the discretion to the official decision-maker. 83
The Morrissey Court seemed to look at the essence of the state action
and determined that parole was a protected liberty interest. 84 In Mor-
rissey, the loss inflicted by the state was that of a person's physical
liberty; perhaps the most important interest of all.85
77. Id.
78. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13-16
(1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
79. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
80. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (emphasis in original). For a discussion
of this change, see Schwartz, Olim v. Wakinekona: The Hands Off Doctrine Gains Further
Support in Prison Transfer Decisions, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 433,
439-43 (1984). However, another writer viewed Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
decided the same day as Morrissey, as rejecting the grievous loss criterion. See Herman, supra
note 73 at 504.
81. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
82. Id. at 474.
83. See Herman, supra note 73, at 505.
84. Id.
85. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975) (depri-
vation of liberty is the harshest action the state can take against the individual).
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B. Group One's Claim
Group One alleged that the liberty interest was created by the
Status Review Plan, 86 the policies of the executive regarding Mariel
Cubans, 87 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 88
In rejecting these arguments, the district court noted that
although the Status Review Plan seemed to place some limits on the
Attorney General's discretion, the Eleventh Circuit had determined
that the Plan did not limit the discretion of the Attorney General.89
Further, the court ruled that the executive policies pertaining to
Mariel Cubans who admitted committing serious crimes in Cuba, did
not place any limits on official discretion. 9° Finally, the court ruled
that the plaintiffs' political asylum claims could not be heard on a
class-wide basis. Thus, the court did not decide whether the Protocol
Agreement created a liberty interest in parole.91
C. Group Two's Claim
The previously paroled Mariel Cubans (Group Two) argued that
they had a:
federally created liberty interest in their continued parole by virtue
of (1) the Attorney General's Status Review Plan;[92] (2) the gen-
eral parole regulations at 8 C.F.R. 212.5(d)(2);[931 (3) the creation
86. Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986). The plaintiffs
argued that instead of using the parole standards in 8 U.S.C. section 1 182(d)(5), the Attorney
General "considerably constricted his substantive discretion by issuing the Status Review
Plan." Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 893-94.
The Status Review Plan required the INS to first individually review each detainee's file.
Then if the reviewing official did not recommend parole, the review went before a panel con-
sisting of immigration officials and Department of Justice personnel who personally inter-
viewed the detainee. To be implemented, the panel recommendations for parole required
approval by the Commissioner of the INS. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 102 (4th Cir.
1982).
87. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 894. The executive pronouncement or-
dered Mariel Cubans who committed serious crimes in Cuba to be securely confined and sub-
ject to exclusion proceedings according with "Constitutional requirements for due process."
Those Mariel Cubans who violated United States law after arrival would be confined and
subject to exclusion. Id.
88. Id. at 893. The Protocol is found in 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6557. For a discus-
sion of the Protocol applied to indefinite detention, see Helton, supra note 23, at 377-78.
89. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 894 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957
(I Ith Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
90. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 894.
91. Id. at 895.
92. See supra note 86.
93. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(d)(2) reads:
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of a special "Cuban/Haitian entrant" status for Mariel Cubans;94
and (4) the Presidential invitation to Mariel Cubans to come to this
country.9 5
The court rejected the Status Review Plan creating a liberty in-
terest because of Eleventh Circuit precedent. 96 Likewise, the court
found that since the parole regulations contained at 8 C.F.R. section
212.5(d) placed fewer restrictions on discretion than did the Status
Review Plan, no liberty interest was created. 97 The district court rea-
soned that Eleventh Circuit precedent required the court to hold that
neither the Status Review Plan nor the C.F.R. parole regulations re-
quired this ruling.
98
The Cuban/Haitian entrant status posed a different question.
The court found that President Carter sought congressional legisla-
tion that would have treated Mariel Cubans differently from ordinary
excludable aliens.99 According INS policy, Mariel Cubans "were to
upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the
opinion of the district director in charge of the area in which the alien is located
neither emergency nor public interest warrants the continued presence of the alien in
the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he
or she shall be restored to the status he or she had at the time of parole .... If the
exclusion order cannot be executed by deportation within a reasonable time, the alien
shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the district director the
public interest requires that the alien be continued in custody.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(d)(2) (1986).
94. In June of 1980 the Carter Administration announced that it would seek special legis-
lation to deal with the unique circumstances of the Mariel Cubans. Pending congressional
approval, Mariel Cubans would be entitled to a six month parole renewal which would enable
them to qualify for public assistance. 57 Interpreter Releases 305 (June 30, 1980).
In October 1984, the INS conceded that Mariel Cubans qualified for permanent resident
visas under a 1966 Congressional Act. 61 Interpreter Releases 847-50 (Oct. 19, 1984); see
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
95. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 895 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986). Group
One could not logically assert that the President of the United States invited criminals and
mental incompetents to come to the United States.
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 896. The court ruled that the parole
regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) placed fewer restrictions on the discretion of the Attorney
General than did the Status Review Plan. Since the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Status
Review Plan did not place substantive limits on official discretion, it followed that the regula-
tions in 8 C.F.R. section 212.5(d) did not place substantive limits on official discretion. Fer-
nandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 896.
98. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 896. "To hold otherwise would be incon-
sistent with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Garcia-Mir v. Smith." Id.
99. The legislation sought would entitle Mariel Cubans to be allowed to remain in the
United States instead of being excluded and deported. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.
Supp. at 896.
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be 'paroled or granted extended voluntary departure or stay of depor-
tation as appropriate' instead of being processed under the ordinary
exclusion or deportation procedures."00 Although Congress failed to
enact the proposed legislation,' 0 ' the govenment accepted the policy
as set forth by the INS. 102 Upon locating suitable sponsors, the
Mariel Cubans were paroled rather than placed in exclusion proceed-
ings. 10 3 Thus, the discretion of the administrative decision-maker was
limited.
1. The Presidential Invitation to Mariel Cubans
The district court found that via specific announcements, Presi-
dent Carter invited to the United States " 'tens of thousands' of
Cubans who had not committed serious crimes in Cuba and who were
not mentally incompetent."' 10 4 Established facts support this finding.
In April of 1980, when over 10,000 Cubans sought refuge in the
Peruvian embassy claiming status as political refugees, President
Carter declared that those Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in Cuba
"may be considered refugees even though they are within their coun-
try of nationality or habitual residence." 10 5 Further, President Carter
requested the appropriation of up to $4.25 million to aid Cuban
resettlement. 1
0 6
In late April, an airlift of Cubans to Costa Rica, arranged by the
United States, began, only to be suspended three days later by Fidel
Castro. 10 7 On May 5, 1980 President Carter held a news conference
which was reported in the Cuban newspaper Granma.108 The Presi-
dent was asked what his "administration intend[ed] to do about en-
forcing current immigration laws and providing funds and programs
for dealing with these newcomers [Mariel Cubans], who are presently
a great burden on local communities?"'1 9 The President replied "We,
as a nation, have always had our arms open to receiving refugees in
accordance with American Law. . . . [W]e'll continue to provide an
100. Id. (quoting INS Telexes).
101. Id.
102. Id. at n.14.
103. Brief of Appellees at 21, Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.) (No. 86-
8010 & 86-8011), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
104. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 896.
105. Pollgreen v. Morris, 496 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
106. See Declaration No. 80-16, 45 Fed. Reg. 28,079 (1980).
107. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1389 (lth Cir. 1983).
108. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 897.
109. Id. at 897-98 n.16.
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open heart and open arms to refugees seeking freedom from Commu-
nist domination and from economic deprivation, brought about primar-
ily by Fidel Castro and his government."' 10
Emphasizing that mainstream opinion considered this response
to be an invitation, the district court quoted from the front page head-
line of the May 6, 1980 edition of the New York Times:
"PRESIDENT SAYS U.S. OFFERS 'OPEN
ARMS' TO CUBAN REFUGEES
WARM RECEPTION IS PROMISED" ''
To support the claim of invitation, the plaintiffs presented documen-
tary evidence that as a result of this statement, the number of Cubans
that came to the United States increased dramatically." 2 The plain-
tiffs' evidence revealed that at the time of the above statement, there
were approximately 16,000 Mariel Cubans in the United States." 13
After the speech, about 16,000 to 20,000 arrived per week.' '4 In addi-
tion, a prior Eleventh Circuit case interpreted President Carter's an-
swer as being an invitation.1 15
2. United States ex reL Paktorovics v. Murff1 6
The plaintiffs argued that the invitation together with the special
Cuban/Haitian entrant status created a liberty interest in parole
which could not be taken away without procedural due process." 7
The plaintiffs claimed that this liberty interest placed the case within
the scope of United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff."18 In
Paktorovics the alien was a Hungarian refugee who was released on
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
111. Id. at 898 n. 17. "As we go to press, the newspapers carry a story that the President
has announced an 'open arms' policy for those fleeing Cuba ...." 57 Interpreter Releases 201
(May 5, 1980).
112. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 103, at 18; see also Boswell, supra note 1, at 928
n.13.
113. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 103, at 18.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1394-95 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Further, the Frade
court noted that at no time did the Carter Administration oppose the exodus from Cuba, but
rather encouraged the mass departure. Id. at 1395-96.
116. 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
117. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 103, at 20.
118. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1146 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
1988]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. section 1182(d)(5). 19 In August of 1957,
the INS revoked Paktorovics' parole because of his alleged conceal-
ment of membership in the Hungarian Communist Party. 120 The re-
sulting exclusion hearing was limited to ascertaining whether
Paktorovics had a valid immigration visa. 121 When Paktorovics ad-
mitted he had no visa, the special inquiry officer found that
Paktorovics was not admissible to the United States. 2 2 The INS de-
tained Paktorovics while waiting to deport him. 123 Paktorovics filed a
writ of habeas corpus after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissed his appeal of the exclusion order.
124
In the habeas corpus action, Paktorovics argued that a message
delivered by President Eisenhower to Congress which "invited" Hun-
garians to seek refuge in the United States coupled with subsequent
congressional action created a liberty interest for Paktorovics in his
continued parole. 125 The presidential message stated that thousands
of Hungarians who fled their homeland after the Soviet invasion de-
sired to remain in the United States. President Eisenhower went fur-
ther to encourage Congress to revise the Immigration and
Naturalization Act to deal with the influx of Hungarian refugees.
126
The subsequent legislation enacted by Congress merely exempted
Hungarian refugees from being excluded solely because of lack of
proper entry papers.' 2
7
In contrast, the government in Paktorovics argued that the case
was an ordinary exclusion proceeding in which the Attorney General
had discretionary authority to revoke parole. 128 The government con-
tended that the Attorney General was only required to provide a rev-
119. United States ex reL. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d at 611. For a discussion regarding
the parole provisions contained in 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(5), see supra note 4 and accompa-
nying text.
120. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d at 611.
121. Id. at 612.
122. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) allows the Attorney General to exclude those aliens pa-
roled who do not have proper entry papers.
123. United States ex reL Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d at 611.
124. Id. at 612.
125. Id. at 613-15.
126. Id. at 613.
127. Hungarian Refugees-Immigration Status-Adjustment, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat.
419 (1958). Although this provision seemingly covered Paktorovics, the court did not use the
statute to reach its decision. Since the statute was not enacted until after Paktorovics' order of
exclusion was entered, the statute was not applicable.
128. United States ex reL. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d at 613.
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ocation hearing to determine the basis for expulsion. 129
The Second Circuit ruled that despite the fact that Paktorovics'
hearing was an exclusion hearing, the case was similar to a situation
where an alien who is in the United States illegally is caught and is
entitled to procedural due process in his deportation proceedings.
130
According to the court, the factor which made Paktorovics different
from an ordinary case "is that Paktorovics was invited here pursuant
to the announced foreign policy of the United States formulated in his
[the President's] directive . . . [and] referred to in his Message to
Congress . .. .,,3 Further, the court held that although the President
lacked the power to alter the law by an invitation to Hungarian refu-
gees, he could, by an invitation and acceptance by the alien, "change
the status of the invited alien 'sufficient[ly] to entitle him to the pro-
tection of our constitution.' ,,t32 The court concluded that in order to
revoke Paktorovics' parole, the Attorney General must provide a
hearing which would satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process. 33
D. The District Court Opinion 134
The district court in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith (Fernandez-
Roque II) followed Eleventh Circuit precedent 35 and found that the
President had invited the Mariel Cubans who had not committed seri-
ous crimes in Cuba and who were not mental incompetents. 36 The
court rejected the government's contention that the invitation implied
that those Cubans coming to the United States shores would be
treated just like any alien caught trying to sneak across the border.
137
The question that the court had to resolve was whether the invi-
129. Id. The procedure of the hearing could be as extensive as the Attorney General de-
sired. Id.
130. Id. at 614.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 615.
134. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1146 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
135. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1983).
136. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 899.
137. Id.
[Ilt is nonsensical to suggest that the President invited plaintiffs to the United States
to be treated no differently than unadmitted aliens who are caught attempting to steal
past our borders. Nor can it be argued with any reason of logic that plaintiffs were
invited to face indefinite confinement until Castro agreed to their return to Cuba ....
Id. at 899-900.
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tation and the special status created a protected liberty interest. 38
The court framed the question as whether the invitation and special
status placed substantive limitations on official discretion. 139 The
court followed Paktorovics and ruled that the invitation afforded the
plaintiffs some status greater than that which is normally given to
aliens stopped at the border.1'°
Thus, the Attorney General's discretion was limited regarding
the parole of Mariel Cubans:' 4' "[T]he invitation concerned the sub-
stantive right to be 'assimilated into American society' not merely the
right to demand that certain procedures be followed by the Attorney
General in determining whether these plaintiffs should be de-
tained."' 142 The court distinguished previous Supreme Court and
Eleventh Circuit cases 43 which dealt with excludable aliens. The
court determined that none of these cases considered the creation of
liberty interests and thus were distinguishable. 44 Instead, the court
followed the Paktorovics' conclusion "that such an invitation altered
an excludable alien's status 'sufficient to entitle him to the protection
of our constitution.' "145
By finding that a liberty interest was created, the only question
left was what process was due before that liberty interest could be
taken away.' 46 The court followed its previously enunciated due pro-
cess protections."47 In addition, the court ordered the Attorney Gen-
eral to file a plan within thirty days that would provide the plaintiffs
of Group Two with hearings according to the due process standards
outlined by the court in Fernandez-Roque 1. 148
138. Id. at 900.
139. Id. (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)).
140. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 900.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957 (1 1th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Garcia-Mir v. Smith,
766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986).
144. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 900.
145. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958)).
146. Id.
147. For the procedural due process standards required by the district court, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-50.
148. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 904. The court also ordered the Attorney
General to begin hearings within sixty days of the order. Id.
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E. Eleventh Circuit Holding
The government filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit. 4 9 Af-
ter briefing and oral arguments, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 150 Un-
like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit refused to treat the case as
unique.' 5' From the beginning of the opinion, and before reaching
the merits, the court indicated that even if a liberty interest was cre-
ated, the appellees (Mariel Cubans) still had no viable claim: "The
question is made more difficult by the fact that, once we enter the
rarefied domain of non-constitutionally based due process rights, the
appellees here are excludable aliens and hence have virtually no con-
stitutional rights in any event."'
' 5 2
The court proceeded to outline how non-constitutional liberty in-
terests are created. The court said that the usual method for creating
this liberty interest was via a rule or regulation which placed substan-
tive limitations on the discretion of official decision makers. 53 Ac-
cording to the court, the plaintiffs failed to "demonstrate the existence
of the particularized standards of review that yield a protected liberty
interest .... ,,154 The court stated that by deciding the case on these
narrow grounds, it properly avoided the constitutional issue of
whether there was an actionable non-constitutional based due process
claim. 55
Specifically, the court held that although the Cuban/Haitian en-
trant status 56 afforded the appellees more generous treatment than
was afforded to other excludable aliens, this special treatment was
149. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986). The appeal sought an emer-
gency stay of the district court's order to prepare and implement a plan for parole hearings.
Id. at 1452-53. The Eleventh Circuit denied the stay of the order to prepare the plan, granted
the stay of implementation of the plan, and finally, denied summary reversal. Id. at 1457. The
court ruled that it would decide the appeal on the merits when the parties fully briefed the
issues. Id.
The plaintiffs filed a cross appeal for Group One to whom the district court denied parole
hearings. See supra texts accompanying note 67-70. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court regarding Group One. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 289 (1986). This part of the opinion will not be discussed in this Note.
150. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
151. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1449.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1450 (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)).
154. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1450.
155. Id. at 1450-51. The court said this despite the fact that it had seemingly decided this
issue. See supra text accompanying note 152.
156. See supra note 94.
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wholly discretionary. 157 The court found that the 1980 legislation
gave Cubans certain benefits, 158 but the legislation did not provide any
guidelines for parole. 159 To the court, this case was indistinguishable
from the recent Supreme Court decision in Connecticut Board of Par-
dons v. Dumschat.16
0
In Dumschat, the Supreme Court ruled that early release from
prison created no actionable interest by the statistical showing that
there was a great likelihood that a prisoner would obtain an early
release.161 The Supreme Court ruled that because "a wholly and ex-
pressly discretionary state privilege [in early parole] has been granted
generously in the past" an actionable liberty interest is not automati-
cally created. 162 The Supreme Court distinguished between the initial
parole of a prisoner and revocation of that parole. 163 The Court con-
cluded that there was no actionable liberty interest in parole, absent
statutory restrictions that limit the official decision-maker's discre-
tion.164 Because the Eleventh Circuit found that the treatment af-
forded the plaintiffs was wholly discretionary, it ruled that no liberty
interest was created. 65
Applying Dumschat, the Eleventh Circuit held that the executive
could not by himself create an actionable liberty interest.166 The
court reasoned that the appellees "provide us with no precedent or
logical basis that the President or one of his subordinates could create
actionable liberty interests."' 67 The court distinguished Paktorovics
saying, Congress had acted along with the President and only the two
branches combined could create an actionable liberty interest. 168
The appellees also argued that the case came under the scope of
Morrissey v. Brewer. 69 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that a
157. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1452.
158. Id. The court found that the purpose of the Special Status was "to aid in resettle-
ment, not to effect parole." Id.
159. Id. The court held that this legislation provided for the executive to retain authority
to act according to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id.
160. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
161. Id. at 464.
162. Id. at 465 (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1979)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 465-66.
165. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289
(1986).
166. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1451.
167. Id. at 1451 (footnotes omitted).
168. Id. at n.5.
169. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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prisoner released on parole has certain due process rights regarding
the revocation of his parole.' 70 This liberty interest exists regardless
of whether the state provided for particularized standards of review
regarding parole revocations.' 7 ' Despite the identical interests in
Morrissey and Garcia-Mir, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Morrissey
was distinguishable: "Careful review of Morrissey and Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates,1 72 [citations omitted] the case that limited
Morrissey's reach, makes clear that the liberty interest extant in the
parole revocation context is derived directly from the Due Process
Clause itself . . . . It is simply not a nonconstitutional interest."'' 73
Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, in Morrissey the rights of
paroled prisoners "are directly derived from the Due Process Clause.
We have held the Due Process Clause yields to these aliens no liberty
interest in a parole revocation hearing. 74
The court concluded, and all parties to the case agreed, that
"with today's decision we have reached the point in this long-standing
controversy where we have rejected all legal theories, constitutional
and otherwise, advanced by the appellees."' 75 Unless the appellees
sought, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the cases would be
dismissed: "[i]nterest reipublicae ut sit finis litium."176
F. Analysis and Criticism of the Eleventh Circuit Decision
1. Excludable Aliens and Invocation of the Constitution
From the outset, the Eleventh Circuit misstated the question at
issue. Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit opinion, the appellees did not
argue that the claimed liberty interest arose from the Constitution,
rather, they argued that it arose from limitations on the Attorney
General's discretion. 77 It is irrelevant whether the Mariel Cubans
had any Constitutional rights apart from their liberty interest claim.
170. Id. at 484-90.
171. Id. at 482.
172. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
173. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1452.
174. Id. at 1453 (citing Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 581-82 n.8 (11th Cir.
1984)).
175. Garcia-Mir Y. Meese, 788 F.2d at 1455.
176. "It is in the interest of the state that there should be an end of a lawsuit." Id. (trans-
lated from Latin text).
177. See Brief for Appellees supra note 103, at 1-28. The court's statement that excludable
aliens "have virtually no constitutional rights" has been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit as
dicta and "not mean[ing] that such aliens have no constitutional protection whatever." Lynch
v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, a plaintiff need not
show that the claimed liberty interest arose directly from the Consti-
tution. 178 The Court ruled that although the Constitution itself offers
plaintiffs no original protection, once a state or the federal govern-
ment grants a liberty interest, that interest cannot be taken away
without constitutional due process protection. 17 9 That is, once the lib-
erty interest is created, the person to whom the liberty interest is
granted can use the Constitution to insure that a deprivation of liberty
is subject to due process protection.so The ability to invoke the Con-
stitution becomes viable when the liberty interest is granted.' 8' Thus,
it is irrelevant whether the Mariel Cubans had any constitutional
rights apart from their claimed liberty interest.
2. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat
In applying Dumschat to this case, the Eleventh Circuit again
misstated the plaintiffs argument. The court considered only whether
the Cuban/Haitian Special Status provided the necessary restrictions
on the discretion of the official decision-maker. 8 2 The court ignored
the plaintiffs' contention that the discretion of the official decision-
maker was limited by both the Presidential invitation and the Cuban/
Haitian Special Status. Further, the plaintiffs' contention was that
they had a liberty interest in their continued parole, not whether they
178. See Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). According to the Court:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfac-
tory behavior while in prison .... But the State having created the right to good
time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major
misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures
appropriate under the circumstances are required by the Due Process Clause to in-
sure that the state created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court went further to add: "[w]e think a person's liberty is equally protected, even
when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State." Id. at 588; see also Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 227 (1976) ("[b]ut the liberty interest there [in Wolff] did not originate in
the constitution .... ").
179. See supra note 178.
180. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 227 (The predicate for invoking the protection of
the fourteenth amendment is a creation of a liberty interest.).
181. Id.
182. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
289 (1986). The court did this by first ruling that benefits from the Cuban/Haitian Special
Status were discretionary. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. The court, however,
did not consider whether the Special Status and the invitation taken together created a liberty
interest.
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should have initially been paroled. 183
3. Morrissey v. Brewer
Contrary to the court's opinion, Greenholtz did not "make clear"
that the liberty interest in Morrissey was derived directly from the due
process clause of the Constitution. Again, Morrissey dealt with a situ-
ation where a state had paroled a prisoner. 84 In order to revoke the
granted parole, the state had to afford the parolee a revocation hear-
ing with due process rights. 85 Thus, until the state paroled the pris-
oner, the prisoner had no ability to use the Constitution. 8 6 The
Court in Greenholtz limited Morrissey to its facts-a prisoner can use
the Constitution to attain due process rights only when he is granted
parole. 18 7
4. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff
The Eleventh Circuit misstated the holding in Paktorovics. The
Second Circuit in Paktorovics held that via President Eisenhower's
statements, Paktorovics was invited and hence had an actionable lib-
erty interest.8 8  Although the Eleventh Circuit distinguished
Paktorovics, the court's ruling is dramatically opposed to Paktorovics:
"[b]ut to give countenance to the notion that one of the political
branches can simply waive a magic wand and 'create' (and by implica-
tion extinguish) constitutional rights would be to completely undo the
notion of limited government through separated, checked and bal-
anced powers." 189
While the precedent supplied by the district court was scant, 90
the logical basis for the court's ruling is solid.' 9' Indeed, no previous
183. Brief for Appellees supra note 103, at 11-29.
184. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); see also supra text accompanying
notes 169-171.
185. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 482.
186. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11
(1979). In Greenholhz the Court ruled "that the state holds out the possibility of parole pro-
vides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained." Id. (emphasis in original).
187. Id.; see Herman, supra note 73, at 512-15. In contrast, a prisoner has no constitu-
tional claim to early parole unless state regulations limit the discretion of the parole board. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. at 12.
188. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958). The
Second Circuit held that the Presidential invitation changed Paktorovic's status. Id.
189. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1451 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289
(1986).
190. Although the district court cited similar cases, the only case on point was Paktorovics.
191. Since the Eleventh Circuit was obliged to follow its own precedent, the court in Gar-
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set of facts compares with the events that led to the arrival of over
120,000 Cubans in 1980.192 The documentary evidence provided by
the plaintiffs and the Eleventh Circuit's own precedent support the
district court's finding that the Cubans were invited to come to the
United States. 193 Is it logical to find that the Cubans who accepted
the President's invitation could be imprisoned indefinitely without
cause upon arrival?
5. Separation of Powers
Nothing in prior Supreme Court rulings on the creation of liberty
interests indicate that the executive branch lacks the power to create
liberty interests. Since the power to exclude is "inherent in the execu-
tive department of the sovereign," Congress may delegate to the exec-
utive enormous zones of power in the immigration field without
giving rise to delegation problems. 94 The Eleventh Circuit has al-
ready found that Congress, in the Immigration and Nationality Act,
gave the executive "sweeping delegations of Congressional author-
ity.' 95 Given this finding, separation of powers is not an issue when
the executive uses its delegated authority not to change the. law re-
garding admission, but only to create a liberty interest for a selected
group of foreign nationals by inviting them to come to the United
States.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's fear that giving countenance to the
presidential invitation would "undo completely the notion of limited
government through separated, checked and balanced powers" is un-
warranted. As the district court observed, the finding that a liberty
interest existed for invited Mariel Cubans does not change the law,
19 6
but rather determines the status of aliens who were not covered by the
Immigration and Naturalization Act. 197 The recognition that the in-
cia-Mir v. Meese was required to find that the Cubans were invited. See United States v. Frade,
709 F.2d 1387, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1983). Logically it follows that those Cubans accepting the
invitation would not be indefinitely detained without hearings with due process rights.
192. Levy, supra note 2, at 297; Boswell, supra note 1, at 935.
193. See United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d at 1394-95. See also Brief for Appellees supra
note 103, at 14-20.
194. United States ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Murf, 388 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
195. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965 (1 1th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
846 (1985).
196. Rather, the finding of a liberty interest for Group two Mariel Cubans entitled only
members of that group to due process protections. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp.
887, 904 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
197. See Helton, supra note 23, at 372 ("Congress ... has not authorized detention of
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vited Mariel Cubans had liberty interests made the United States ac-
countable for its express foreign policy pronouncements. 198 Further,
the district court finding of a liberty interest did not free any Cuban.
Instead, under the ruling, the Cubans who had their parole revoked
would be entitled to due process before the Attorney General could
lawfully detain them indefinitely. 199
Yet the Eleventh Circuit found otherwise. Under the Eleventh
Circuit ruling, if the Attorney General decided to imprison all
120,000 Cubans, no legitimate challenge to this incarceration could be
made. The invited aliens had absolutely no liberty interest in their
freedom. Further, if the Attorney General paroled any Cuban, this
parole could be revoked without any semblance of due process for any
reason detailed in 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(1-33), even for merely not
possessing proper entry papers.
6. Conclusion
As outlined above, the rationale given by the Eleventh Circuit for
denying the plaintiff's claim of a liberty interest is unpersuasive. Un-
derlying the opinion is the sweeping proposition that excludable aliens
"have virtually no constitutional rights in any event." 2°° This propo-
sition allows for the President and the Attorney General to act in any
manner when dealing with excludable aliens. Further, this proposi-
tion potentially allows courts to refuse to entertain any constitutional
claims of excludable aliens.20 1
G. Landon v. Plasencia-An Alternative Rationale
Group Two plaintiffs in Garcia-Mir v. Meese are not ordinary
excludable aliens. The Cuban aliens fell into a category that the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act does not directly address: excluda-
aliens as a deterrent device but as a necessary, temporary measure to effectuate exclusion.")
(footnote omitted); see also Levy, supra note 2, at 308 (temporary detention justifiable for
assuring appearance at immigration proceedings, or while arrangements for expulsion from the
United States are being arranged); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1122 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984) (the government admitted that the Attorney
General does not possess express statutory authority to indefinitely incarcerate).
198. When the executive "invites" aliens to come to the United States, that invitation
changes the status of the invitees. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 899 (citing
United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958)).
199. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 904.
200. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1449 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289
(1986).
201. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1987).
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ble but not deportable. 20 2 In Landon v. Plasencia,203 the Supreme
Court extended due process rights in exclusion hearings to an alien
who was technically excludable but who had unique circumstances.
2
0
4
In Landon, a resident alien (Ms. Plasencia), who entered the
United States in March 1970, left the United States and entered Mex-
ico in June 1975.205 Ms. Plasencia was stopped at the United States
border when she tried to reenter the United States with six undocu-
mented aliens. 20 6 She was detained at the border for inquiry by Immi-
gration officers. After inquiry, the INS gave Ms. Plasencia notice that
they (the INS) were seeking to exclude her.20 7 At the exclusion hear-
ing, the Immigration Judge found that Ms. Plasencia was excludable,
and ordered her "excluded and deported. ' 20 8 The BIA dismissed her
appeal and Ms. Plasencia filed a habeas corpus petition in district
court.
2 0 9
The district court vacated the decision of the BIA and found that
Ms. Plasencia was entitled to deportation proceedings rather than an
exclusion hearing. 210  Specifically the district court found that Ms.
Plasencia's departure to Tijuana was not a "meaningful departure"
and therefore she was entitled to a deportation hearing rather than an
exclusion hearing.
211
Upon review, the Supreme Court ruled that when an alien is
stopped at the border, the alien's status is to be determined in an ex-
clusion proceeding.212  The Court held that Ms. Plasencia was
stopped while trying to "enter" the United States and was only enti-
tled to an exclusion proceeding. 21 3 Again, in ordinary exclusion hear-
202. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
203. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
204. Id. at 32.
205. Id. at 23.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 24-25.
208. Id. The Immigration Judge found that Ms. Plasencia's travels to Mexico constituted
a "meaningful departure" and thus her return to the United States was an "entry." Id. at 24.
The Immigration Judge also found that Ms. Plasencia violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(31)
which allows for the exclusion of an alien seeking admission "who at any time shall have,
knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to
enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at
23.
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 32.
213. Id. at 31-32.
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ings due process is whatever Congress determines is adequate. 21 4
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Ms. Plasencia was entitled to
some due process rights regarding her exclusion hearing.215 The
Court reasoned that once an alien gains admission to the United
States and begins to develop the ties of permanent residence, the
alien's constitutional status changes accordingly. 21 6 Likewise, those
resident aliens returning from non-extended excursions to foreign
countries are entitled to due process rights regarding any "attempt to
exclude" them.217 The Court concluded that "the constitutional suffi-
ciency of procedures provided in any situation, of course varies with
the circumstances" and the district court is the proper place to decide
the necessary procedural due process protections.
2
1
8
The unique circumstances that led to the granting of due process
rights in Ms. Plasencia's exclusion proceeding can be analogized to
the unique circumstances of the detained Mariel Cubans who were
initially granted parole by the Attorney General (Group Two). These
unique circumstances are sufficient to entitle Group Two Mariel
Cubans to due process rights in their parole revocation hearings.
The plaintiffs in Group Two are indeed unique. They were in-
vited to come to the United States, paroled, had their parole revoked,
and were found to be excludable and deportable. Yet, because no
country would take them, they are being indefinitely incarcerated in
federal prison. Unlike the alien in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, the Cubans were not being excluded because of "national se-
curity" reasons.219 Ordinarily, excludable aliens are paroled for a
short period of time while waiting for their status to be determined or
while waiting to be expelled.220 However, the Mariel Cubans of
Group Two spent a substantial amount of time in the United States
while paroled. 22'
Like Ms. Plasencia's situation, these Cubans developed ties to the
community in which they were paroled. 222 Thus, even though the
214. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
215. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 33-34.
216. Id. at 32.
217. Id. at 33.
218. Id. at 36-37.
219. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1129 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d
576 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
220. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
221. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 895 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub
noma. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
222. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. at 895 n. 12 ("Because these class members
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Immigration and Nationality Act maintians parole of the alien does
not constitute an admission, with Mariel Cubans the necessary ties
required to create due process protections were formed by their
lengthy parole in the community.
The finding of the Eleventh Circuit deprives the Cuban aliens not
only of their physical liberty without due process, but also of their
intimate ties to the community without due process. The Mariel
Cubans of Group Two present a unique situation and, like Ms.
Plasencia, they should not be treated as aliens who conveniently fit
into the United States immigration laws.
III. CONCLUSION
As argued in this Note, the United States immigration laws do
not specifically provide guidelines for the Attorney General, or the
courts to follow when confronted with indefinitely detained excluda-
ble aliens who cannot be physically expelled from the United States.
Since Congress has plenary power over immigration matters, it is up
to that body to remedy this void.
The above analysis has shown that the acts of the executive
branch created a liberty interest in the Mariel Cubans of Group Two.
It is unthinkable that the courts of this country, which represent the
"home of the free," would allow any person to be indefinitely incar-
cerated in prison without minimal due process. By denying certiorari
in Garcia-Mir v. Meese that is exactly what the majority of the
Supreme Court has done.223
Philip Erickson
had been living freely in American society, often when they entered the penitentiary they left
behind wives and children who are American citizens.").
223. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to grant certiorari in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 107
S. Ct. 289 (1986).
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